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A State-Level View of NAFTA: Economic 
Implications and Policy Options
WILLIAM MCGUIRE
This Article examines the economic implications of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its recent renegotiation from the 
perspective of individual U.S. states. Individual states have very few 
options in the arena of international commerce, despite the fact that 
trade agreements like NAFTA make some states better off while 
simultaneously making others worse off. This Article provides a 
framework to understand how NAFTA redistributes wealth among U.S.
states, as well as what options are available to states seeking to 
capitalize on new opportunities or mitigate harms from changes in 
trade policy. States face legal constraints from the Commerce and 
Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as international 
law – specifically, the World Trade Organization (WTO). There is also 
very little evidence to support the efficacy of those policies clearly 
within the legal rights of state and local governments. Instead, states 
may need to rely on their representatives in Congress to more forcefully 
represent their interests in international trade negotiations. These 
points are made salient by the recent renegotiation of NAFTA to 
produce the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Trump Administration has just recently concluded talks to renegotiate 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico. 
As of this writing, the agreement still needs to be ratified by the governments of 
the member countries, but it is all but certain that the new agreement, called the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), will come into force.1
NAFTA has been the subject of contentious political debate at least since the 
1992 presidential campaign, when Ross Perot coined the term “giant sucking 
sound” to describe the relocation of manufacturing from the United States to 
Mexico.2 The renegotiation objectives released by the office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) reflect similar concerns, and aligned with the rhetoric 
Trump employed on the campaign trail and after assuming office.3 The 
President has expressed a great deal of skepticism about the value of deeper 
global integration, and his “America First” slogan seems to signal a greater 
willingness to raise barriers to trade, or at least demand greater concessions from 
trade partners in terms of opening to U.S. exports. Recent experience with steel 
and aluminum tariffs shows that Trump is willing to take an aggressive stance 
to pursue what he sees as U.S. national interests in trade negotiations.4
The focus on a single national interest ignores the fact that, while the trade 
agreements are negotiated at the federal level, the consequences will be felt at 
the level of states and counties. Some states and counties will be made better off 
by NAFTA or similar trade agreements, while others will be made worse off. 
At the same time, the Constitution and existing trade agreements constrain the 
ability of state and lower governments to engage in international commerce, 
including offering support for local industries that may be adversely affected by 
changes in trade policy. This Article will offer some insight into the disparate 
impacts NAFTA has had across different U.S. states. Additionally, this Article
will review the legal constraints faced by state and local governments as they 
search for policies to manage the state-level consequences of USMCA and 
future trade negotiations.
                                                                                                                     
1 See Jen Kirby, USMCA, the New Trade Deal Between the US, Canada, and Mexico, 
Explained, VOX (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/2/17923638/usmca-trump-
nafta-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/S9TQ-VPP4].
2 See Gary Hufbauer, Ross Perot Was Wrong About NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-
nafta/ross-perot-was-wrong-about-nafta [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
3 See generally U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE 
NAFTA RENEGOTIATION (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases
/NAFTAObjectives.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ2T-6S5R] [hereinafter USTR] (outlining 
specific objectives for the NAFTA renegotiation process).
4 See Kevin Breuninger, Canada Announces Retaliatory Tariffs on Steel and 
Aluminum, CNBC (May 31, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/31/canada-announces-
retaliatory-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/LNQ5-72DM].
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS OF THE NAFTA
RENEGOTIATION
Renegotiating NAFTA was a signature promise of President Trump’s
campaign.5 It fit with his broader theme of skepticism toward free trade, as was 
also demonstrated by his withdrawal of the United States from the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).6 President Trump was vague about his NAFTA renegotiation 
objectives while on the campaign trail, beyond promising he would promote the 
interests of American workers and firms.7 He also stated several times that he 
was willing to withdraw the U.S. from NAFTA if he is not happy with the results 
of the negotiation.8 Canada9 and Mexico10 made similar threats.
On July 17, the U.S. Trade Representative released a summary of their 
objectives for renegotiating NAFTA.11 The document lists twenty-two major 
areas the USTR would focus on during the negotiations, ranging from 
intellectual property protections to labor and environmental standards.12 Critics 
of the USMCA point out that the new agreement falls short of achieving the 
Administration’s loftier objectives, and represents only a minor update of the 
existing agreement.13 Some of the Administration’s objectives were achieved. 
U.S. dairy farmers will have greater access to the Canadian market, and new 
rules were negotiated governing trade in digital goods.14 The Administration 
was also successful in updating the “rules of origin” for auto manufacturing, 
which determine how much of the value of an automobile must be added within 
                                                                                                                     
5 Megan Cassella, Trump Launches NAFTA Renegotiation, POLITICO (May 18, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/18/trump-adminstration-formally-kicks-off-
renegotiation-of-nafta-238552 [https://perma.cc/DLD4-3EWM].
6 C. Fred Bergsten & Monica de Bolle, Overview, in A PATH FORWARD FOR NAFTA,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 5 (C. Fred Bergsten & Monica de Bolle eds., July 2017), 
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb17-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B7V-KY2J].
7 See Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan, C-
SPAN (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?418209-1/donald-trump-makes-final-
campaign-stop-grand-rapids-michigan&start=1343 [https://perma.cc/6VUD-94ZD].
8 See If Trump Pulls Trigger on NAFTA Withdrawal, Mexico Will Walk Away, CNBC
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/30/if-trump-pulls-trigger-on-nafta-
withdrawal-mexico-will-walk-away.html [https://perma.cc/VD9Y-65HS].
9 See David Ljunggren & Andrea Hopkins, Canada Suggests It Could Quit NAFTA 
Talks over Dispute Mechanism, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trade-nafta-canada/canada-suggests-it-could-quit-nafta-talks-over-dispute-
mechanism-idUSKCN1AU1CK [https://perma.cc/959Y-QSPD].
10 See Elisabeth Malkin, Facing Trump, Mexicans Think the Unthinkable: Leaving 
NAFTA, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/world/americ
as/trump-mexico-nafta.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
11 USTR, supra note 3, at 4.
12 Id. at 4–17.
13 See John Brinkley, USMCA Is Not the Magnificent Trade Deal Trump Says It Is,
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/10/08/usmca-is-
not-the-magnificent-trade-deal-trump-says-it-is/ [https://perma.cc/4HE2-ZHCN].
14 See Kirby, supra note 1.
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member states to qualify for zero tariffs.15 The new rules require that 75% of 
components be manufactured within USMCA member states in order to qualify, 
compared to 62.5% under NAFTA.16
The U.S. also achieved some of its objectives related to so-called “deep 
integration,” or the harmonization of domestic regulations.17 The emphasis on 
“deep integration” is somewhat surprising, since these were important elements 
of the TPP,18 which President Trump has abandoned.19 In the USMCA, the 
Administration successfully negotiated stronger protections for certain kinds of 
intellectual property.20 There is another important provision related to labor 
standards in the auto industry. To qualify for zero tariffs under USMCA, at least 
40% of the value of an automobile must be added using workers who earn at 
least $16 per hour.21 This provision would come into force by 2023.22 Critics 
argue that this new “minimum wage” standard, along with stricter rules of 
origin, may actually reduce employment in the U.S. auto sector by driving up 
costs.23 Rather than abide by the new USMCA rules to qualify for zero percent 
tariffs, it may be cheaper to move production out of North America and import 
autos under the U.S. most-favored nation (MFN) tariff of 2.5%.24
The U.S. was unable to achieve several key objectives that would have
given the President more flexibility to raise trade barriers to protect domestic 
industries.25 Specifically, the USTR was unable to eliminate NAFTA’s Chapter 
19 dispute settlement mechanism and the global safeguard exclusion.26 In the 
past, these provisions have prevented the U.S. from raising barriers to shield 
domestic industries from competition with Canadian and Mexican producers.27
Critics argued that removing these provisions would have been the beginning of 
                                                                                                                     
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 USTR, supra note 3, at 12–13.
18 See GARY HUFBAUER & EUIJIN JUNG, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., NAFTA
RENEGOTIATION: U.S. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE INTERESTS VIS-À-VIS CANADA 12 (2017),
https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/nafta-renegotiation-us-offensive-and-defensive-
interests-vis-vis-canada [https://perma.cc/T2Y3-FAQY].
19 BERGSTEN, supra note 6, at 24.
20 IAN F. FERGUSSON & M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10997,
PROPOSED U.S-MEXICO-CANADA (USMCA) TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (2018).
21 Kirby, supra note 1.
22 Id.
23 See Jeffrey Schott, For Mexico, Canada, and the United States, a Step Backwards on 




25 See Chad Bown, Trump’s Renegotiation Could Take the “Free” Out of NAFTA’s
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the end of “free” trade under NAFTA.28 It is important to note that the USMCA 
includes a sixteen year sunset clause, and requires review every six years.29 If 
future Administrations adopt a similarly aggressive stance, these provisions will 
certainly be the focus of future USMCA negotiations.
A. Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement
Chapter 19 provides a process for binding arbitration over antidumping and 
countervailing duties (AD/CVD).30 These measures are authorized under Title 
VII of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930.31 Under Title VII, the U.S. International 
Trade Commission (USITC) is tasked with investigating claims that domestic 
firms are subject to “material injury” (or the threat thereof) due to dumping or 
illegal subsidies by foreign governments.32 If the USITC finds in favor of the 
domestic industry, U.S. Customs will impose special duties on imports from 
specific countries in order to bring these import prices closer to their “fair”
value.33 Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, the 
U.S. is required to conduct “sunset” reviews no later than thirty days before the 
five-year anniversary of the AV/CVDs being imposed.34 To keep the duties in 
place, the USITC must determine that revoking the AV/CVD measures would 
again lead to “material injury” due to dumping or illegal subsidy.35
USITC findings of material injury can be appealed.36 Non-NAFTA 
members can appeal these decisions to the U.S. Court of International Trade.37
NAFTA members, on the other hand, can call for the establishment of a 
binational panel to review AD/CVD decisions.38 Both affected nations are 
represented on the panel, and its decision is binding.39 The Chapter 19 dispute 
settlement mechanism was enshrined in NAFTA partly in response to the U.S.’s
frequent use of AD/CVDs in the 1980s.40 It has since produced many judgments 
                                                                                                                     
28 Id.
29 Kirby, supra note 1.
30 Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations, U.S. INT’L





34 Understanding Five-Year (Sunset) Reviews, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://ww
w.usitc.gov/press_room/us_sunset.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/63NU-
8UKP].
35 Id. 
36 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 19, art. 1904, Dec. 17, 




40 See Bown, supra note 25.
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striking down U.S. AD/CVDs.41 Experts believe it has also prevented the use of 
AD/CVD measures among NAFTA partners.42 Despite the USTR’s strong 
stance against it, Chapter 19 of NAFTA is now contained in Chapter 10 of the 
USMCA.43
B. The Global Safeguard Exclusion
The global safeguard exclusion is related to a different class of trade 
protections. Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) authorizes member states to temporarily raise trade barriers on specific 
products, so long as they are applied in a non-discriminatory way.44 Section 201 
of the Trade Act of 1974 provides the legal framework for these safeguards in 
the U.S.45 The investigative process is similar to the one for AD/CVD cases, 
with two important exceptions. First, safeguards do not require a finding of 
unfair or illegal trade practices.46 Second, the standard for “material harm” is 
higher in safeguard investigations compared to AD/CVD investigations.47
Section 201 requires the injury (or threat thereof) to be “serious.”48 If the USITC 
finds there is serious injury to a domestic industry, they recommend a remedy 
to the President (usually some kind of trade barrier), who has final authority 
over the remedy.49 Protections are permitted for an initial period of four years, 
with a possible extension up to eight total years.50
Although safeguards are supposed to be imposed in a non-discriminatory 
manner, the global safeguard exclusion carves out exemptions for Canada and 
Mexico from remedies recommended by the USITC.51 Imports from Mexico 
and Canada are considered exempt from safeguards following a Section 201 
investigation unless the USITC finds (1) imports from an individual NAFTA 
                                                                                                                     
41 See Cyndee Todgham Cherniak, NAFTA Chapter 19 Bi-National Panel Review 
Process Used Rarely by Canada/US; BUT Remains Needed, CANADA-U.S. BLOG (July 26, 
2017), http://www.canada-usblog.com/2017/07/26/nafta-chapter-19-bi-national-panel-
review-process-used-rarely-by-canadaus-but-needed/ [https://perma.cc/YM4Y-J92S].
42 Bown, supra note 25.
43 Gregory Spak et. al, United States, Canada, and Mexico Announce New Trilateral 
Trade Agreement to Replace NAFTA, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.lexology.co
m/library/detail.aspx?g=2abffd0b-b4e8-45ee-9fcc-33226ecb3ad6 [https://perma.cc/82BC-
JGYK].







50 GLOBAL AFFAIRS CAN., U.S. TRADE REMEDY LAW: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
(2013), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/section03.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/NN7D-Y4XP].
51 See id. 
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country account for a “substantial” share of the imported goods targeted in the 
investigation, and (2) imports from NAFTA countries are important contributors 
to the “serious injury” found during the investigation.52 For example, the USITC 
has recently determined that imports of certain types of photovoltaic cells are a 
cause of “serious injury” to domestic producers.53 Canada sought an exemption 
from the safeguards as member of NAFTA. In their published decision, the 
majority of the USITC panel found that imports from Canada did not satisfy (1) 
and (2), and excluded them from the proposed remedies.54
Considering Mexico and Canada account for approximately twenty-five 
percent of total U.S. trade in goods and services,55 the global safeguards 
exemption clearly limits the President’s power to protect domestic industries. 
Given the President’s skepticism toward free trade, it is not surprising that the 
USTR would call for this provision of NAFTA to be eliminated. However, the 
USMCA reproduces the global safeguard exclusion that was found in Chapter 
8 of NAFTA.56
C. NAFTA and the Trade Balance
The Trump Administration has cited the U.S. trade deficit as a justification 
for its aggressive negotiating strategy.57 However, this reasoning has drawn 
scrutiny from experts.58 U.S. trade with Canada is roughly balanced.59 The U.S.
does maintain a trade deficit with Mexico, but Mexico maintains a trade deficit 
with the rest of the world.60 It would be difficult to persuade either of these 
countries to make concessions that would increase their bilateral deficit with the 
U.S. It stands to reason that they would be unwilling to agree to the Trump 
Administration’s demands for more flexible protectionism without achieving 
increased protection of their own industries. 
                                                                                                                     
52 Id.
53 News Release No. 17-133, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Crystalline Silicon 
Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or Not Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products) (Sept.
22, 2017), https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2017/er0922ll832.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9S3V-66GE].
54 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, INV. NO. TA-201-075, CRYSTALLINE SILICON 
PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS (WHETHER OR NOT FULLY ASSEMBLED INTO OTHER PRODUCTS)
(2017), https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/solar201_remedy_commissioner
statements.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3ZK-T2W7].
55 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES (2016), https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/
trade/2017/trad1216.htm [https://perma.cc/BQF4-J2DN].
56 GOV’T OF CAN., TRADE REMEDIES AND RELATED DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (CHAPTER 
19) SUMMARY (Oct. 2018), http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/usmca-aeumc/dispute-differends.aspx?lang=eng
[https://perma.cc/D3H2-R6RA].
57 USTR, supra note 3, at 2.
58 See BERGSTEN, supra note 6, at 15.
59 Id. at 16.
60 Id. at 16.
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Critics also point out that the Administration’s attempt to address the trade 
deficit through bilateral or narrowly multilateral negotiations is fundamentally 
misguided.61 The trade balance is determined by domestic macroeconomic 
conditions, not trade agreements.62 The U.S. maintains a trade deficit because 
its domestic savings (by households, firms, and government) are smaller than 
domestic investment.63 Raising barriers to trade against NAFTA partners will 
be disruptive and costly in the short term and will not have any long-term effect 
on the trade balance. For instance, decreasing the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with 
Mexico, holding domestic savings and investment constant, will simply increase 
U.S. trade deficits with other countries as production shifts to other countries in 
order to circumvent the new barriers. 
U.S. trade policy with Japan in the 1970s and 80s is an instructive example 
of the last point. Following negotiations with the U.S., Japan adopted voluntary 
export restraints (VERs) on goods sold to the U.S. as well as voluntary import 
expansions (VIEs) for U.S. goods sold in Japan.64 While significant effects were 
seen within specific sectors, these policies had no net effect on the U.S. global 
balance of trade.65 In light of the marginal changes in policy produced by the 
USMCA, one should expect no substantial changes in the U.S. trade deficit. 
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF NAFTA
If NAFTA renegotiation will not ultimately affect the balance of trade, it is 
worth asking what the U.S. stands to gain or lose from these negotiations. Since 
the USMCA is not a major departure from NAFTA, the changes are likely to be 
subtle. To understand what is likely to come from the USMCA, it is important 
to identify what the net effect of NAFTA has been, as well as the regional and 
sectoral variation in those effects. 
A. Aggregate Effects
Measuring the aggregate effects of NAFTA for the U.S. is a contentious 
subject, at least in popular media. On the campaign trail, President Trump made 
it clear that he thought NAFTA was the “worst trade deal” the U.S. had ever 
signed.66 Critics of the deal point to losses in U.S. manufacturing employment 
                                                                                                                     
61 Id. at 17.
62 Id. at 14–15.
63 For a non-technical explanation, see SCOTT A. WOLLA, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST.
LOUIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: MAKING SENSE OF THE TRADE DEFICIT 3–4 (Nov. 2016), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2016/11/01/international-trade/ 
[https://perma.cc/YHW5-B4SC].
64 See BERGSTEN, supra note 6, at 18.
65 Id.
66 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Alan Rappeport, After Calling NAFTA ‘Worst Trade Deal,’
Trump Appears to Soften Stance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/03/30/business/nafta-trade-deal-trump.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].
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and the persistent U.S. trade deficit.67 Then Presidential candidate Ross Perot 
famously coined the phrase “giant sucking sound” to describe the loss of U.S. 
manufacturing employment to Mexico as a result of NAFTA.68 This heated 
political rhetoric reflects, in part, the fact that NAFTA was the first free trade 
agreement the U.S. signed with a developing country.69 The criticisms tend to 
focus on the threat posed by competition with Mexico, while ignoring any 
effects from increased trade with Canada.70
These concerns are not without cause. NAFTA did contribute to lower 
employment in certain sectors in the U.S.71 The magnitudes of those effects, 
however, is a subject of some controversy. Robert Scott published a study in 
2011 attempting to estimate the net job loss due to increased trade with 
Mexico.72 The analysis focused on the increased trade deficit with Mexico after 
1994, which the author attributes to NAFTA.73 He estimated that increased trade 
with Mexico due to NAFTA caused the loss of nearly 700,000 jobs in the U.S.,
with that largest effects felt in the manufacturing sector.74 It is important to 
consider this study in the context of the claim made above: bilateral trade deals 
do not determine the size of the U.S. global trade deficit. Scott’s study assumed 
that the net imports from Mexico would otherwise have been produced in the 
U.S. if NAFTA had not been signed. Since domestic savings were still less than 
domestic investment during this period, these goods would simply have been 
produced in some other country.75
Proponents do not deny that NAFTA was disruptive to the economic order 
in the U.S. It is well known that lower trade barriers will drive smaller, less 
efficient firms to bankruptcy while allowing larger, more efficient firms to 
expand.76 The net result is an increase in productivity through this process of 
                                                                                                                     
67 See USTR, supra note 3, at 2.
68 See The 1992 Campaign: Transcript of 2d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton and 
Perot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/16/us/the-1992-
campaign-transcript-of-2d-tv-debate-between-bush-clinton-and-perot.html [on file with 
Ohio State Law Journal].
69 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., NAFTA AT 20:
MISLEADING CHARGES AND POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS 1 (2014), https://piie.com/sites
/default/files/publications/pb/pb14-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNL9-VV47].
70 See id. at 11, 16. 
71 ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POLICY INST., NAFTA’S IMPACT ON THE STATES (2001), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_nafta01_impactstates/#anchor11
6616 [https://perma.cc/9FBT-6B7B].
72 ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON. POLICY INST., HEADING SOUTH: U.S.-MEXICO TRADE AND 




75 See HUFBAUER, supra, note 69, at 5. 
76 See ANDREW BERNARD ET AL., INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, FALLING TRADE COSTS,
HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS, AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS 3, 6 (Apr. 2003), https://www.ifs.org.
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“creative destruction,” and as resources are realigned with a country’s
comparative advantage.77 The disruptions caused by lower trade barriers also 
increase “churn” in labor markets as workers leave shrinking industries to join 
the ones that are expanding.78 Unfortunately, it is not always obvious which jobs 
are “created” due to lower trade barriers, while it is very visible which jobs are 
lost.79 Proponents argue that NAFTA’s contribution to U.S. labor markets was 
not necessarily more jobs, but better jobs, as workers left shrinking import-
competing sectors and higher-paying jobs were created elsewhere.80
The U.S. auto industry has been particularly successful at taking advantage 
of the new opportunities created through NAFTA.81 They have successfully 
expanded their supply chains into Mexico and the Canada.82 Since 1994, the gap 
between U.S. auto imports and exports has widened – reflecting the increasing 
importance of sourcing components from abroad.83 This has also been reflected 
in a decline in U.S. employment in the auto sector.84 However, real value added 
per worker rose by 41% U.S. in the two decades since NAFTA was signed.85
Real hourly compensation for U.S. auto workers has also increased by 
approximately 19% over the same time period.86 The auto industry is also at the 
center of the new rules of origin and “minimum wage” requirements in the 
USMCA.87 However, critics argue that these provisions may end up 
significantly raising auto prices for U.S. consumers,88 and actually encourage 
more auto imports from abroad rather than more production in the U.S.89
So, what is the true net effect of NAFTA? Answering this question requires 
a sophisticated theoretical framework and empirical methodology. It is not 
enough to simply compare levels of GDP or employment before and after 
NAFTA came into effect. We must take into account the complex economic 
relationships among NAFTA countries, between NAFTA and the rest of the 
                                                                                                                     
uk/wps/wp0310.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C3S-XFYA] (finding that the general consensus is 
that “foreign competition both reduces the domestic mark share of import-competing firms 
and reallocates domestic market share from inefficient to efficient firms”). 
77 See id. at 2.
78 See id. at 19.
79 See HUFBAUER, supra note 69, at 6.
80 Id. at 7. 
81 NAFTA, 20 Years Later: Do the Benefits Outweigh the Costs? WHARTON, UNIV. OF 





85 HUFBAUER, supra note 69, at 9.
86 Id. at 10.
87 Kirby, supra note 1.
88 See Jeffrey Schott, A Reported NAFTA Auto Deal Would Backfire Against 
Consumers and Auto Makers Alike, PIIE: TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Aug. 24, 2018), 
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/reported-nafta-auto-deal-would-
backfire-against-consumers-and [https://perma.cc/DQ7B-5RNK].
89 Schott, supra note 23.
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world, as well as among traded and non-traded sectors within these countries. It 
is instructive to compare the results of the study published by Anderson and van 
Wincoop in 200190 against the those published by Caliendo and Parro in 2015.91
The earlier study found that NAFTA produced modest net gains for Canada and 
the U.S., while imposing losses on Mexico.92 They also found that NAFTA 
imposed miniscule losses on the rest of the world, mostly due to trade 
diversion.93 On the other hand, Caliendo and Parro found that NAFTA created 
modest gains for the U.S. (once again), modest losses for Canada, and fairly 
large gains for Mexico.94
The differences in findings reflects a difference in methodology: Caliendo 
and Parro accounted for the complex linkages among heterogeneous sectors that 
characterize a modern economy.95 In other words, NAFTA affected different 
sectors of the U.S. economy differently. Since these sectors are interdependent, 
gains and losses in one sector have a ripple effect through the rest of the 
economy.96 Caliendo and Parro found that failing to account for these “ripples”
causes a substantial underestimation of the aggregate welfare effects from 
NAFTA.97 Still, even after accounting for these “ripples,” the net effect of 
NAFTA on the U.S. has been small.98 The Congressional Budget Office 
estimates the effect of NAFTA on GDP growth to be “probably no more 
than . . . a few hundredths of one percent.”99 By the same token, USMCA will 
likely have no appreciable effects on overall U.S. GDP growth. However, 
emphasizing the aggregate effects covers up the highly uneven distribution of 
gains and losses across different industries and across different regions within 
the U.S.
B. Decomposing the Gains and Losses from Trade
Contrary to the sometimes heated political rhetoric, there seems to be a 
consensus in the economic literature that NAFTA was a modest net benefit to 
the United States. However, there were clear winners and losers within the U.S.
as well as within Canada and Mexico.100 To make sense of this heterogeneity, 
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it is important to remember that the distribution of the gains from trade depend 
on the nature of a country’s comparative advantage.101 Some sectors will expand 
as they are able to reach new export markets or gain access to cheap intermediate 
goods.102 Other sectors will shrink as they face of more intense head-to-head 
competition with cheaper imports.103 This has implications for how the gains 
from trade are distributed between workers and owners of capital, and even 
among different types of workers. 
When trying to understand the linkages between barriers to trade and the 
distribution of the gains from trade, economists often turn to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem.104 Put simply, this theorem states that lower barriers to 
trade will make a country’s relatively abundant factors of production better off, 
while making others worse off.105 Viewed through this lens, it is not surprising 
that U.S. manufacturing workers were made worse off due to NAFTA: Mexico 
is relatively abundant in the types of workers employed in these manufacturing 
jobs compared to the U.S. The theorem also asserts that others in the U.S. will 
be made better off, even as manufacturing workers are made worse off.106
Considering the differences between the U.S. and Mexico, this would likely 
include highly skilled workers and owners of capital.
Although they did not study NAFTA specifically, a study published in 2014
provides some evidence to support this point.107 The authors estimated the 
effects of exposure to globalization on different types of workers in different 
industries.108 They measure exposure to globalization in terms of industry 
export share, import penetration, and foreign affiliate employment (meant to 
capture the degree of offshoring).109 They also distinguish between more and 
less “routine” occupations, which gives some indication of workers’ skill 
levels.110 Their findings demonstrate the wide dispersion of gains and losses 
within the U.S. from NAFTA and similar trade agreements.111 First, they show 
that import penetration and offshoring to low wage countries (like Mexico) 
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tends to lower U.S. wages.112 This effect is particularly strong for workers 
performing the most routine tasks.113 They find similar effects on employment 
for these workers.114 Interestingly, offshoring to low-wage countries actually 
increases wages for workers in the least routine (highest-skilled) occupations.115
There is also a positive (but statistically insignificant) effect of import 
penetration on high-skilled workers wages.116
These results confirm the basic intuition of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
– lower barriers to trade with low-income countries allow U.S. firms to find less-
expensive substitutes for low-skill U.S. workers. This reduces employment 
opportunities for these workers and reduces wages for low-skill workers who 
are able to keep their jobs. At the same time, high-skill workers are better off 
thanks to cheaper imported goods or intermediate components (in the case of
offshoring), which are complementary to them in their occupations. To 
understand this, it is helpful to return to the example of the U.S. auto industry. 
Following NAFTA, total employment in the U.S. auto sector shrank, but there 
were large increases in value-added per worker and real compensation for those 
still employed.117 This corresponds to a change in the kinds of tasks workers 
perform in U.S. auto plants. The workers who remain employed in the U.S. auto 
industry today do a very different kind of work than the average plant employee 
in 1993.118 Rather than performing relatively simple tasks to manufacture 
components, workers engage in skill-intensive, non-routine tasks that cannot be 
easily outsourced or automated.119
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is closely related to the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem, another classic result that predicts how lower barriers to trade will 
affect different industries within a country.120 Put simply, when barriers to trade 
fall, industries that intensively use the country’s abundant factor of production 
should expand while others should shrink.121 Again, it would be a mistake to 
ascribe all changes in industry size after 1994 to NAFTA.122 However, large 
changes in the volume of trade among NAFTA members has been documented 
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in a few key sectors since the agreement was signed.123 A study by the 
Congressional Research Service in 2003 highlighted the automotive industry 
along with chemicals and allied products, computer equipment, textiles and
apparel, and microelectronics.124 All of these sectors saw significant rapid 
growth in total trade volume as well as large increases in trade deficits between 
the U.S. and its NAFTA partners.125
NAFTA has also become very important for U.S. agriculture. Mexico and 
Canada are major export markets for U.S. agricultural products.126
Approximately 28% of total U.S. maize production is exported to Mexico.127
Mexico and Canada collectively account for nearly one-third of U.S. beef 
exports.128 As with the auto industry, agricultural supply chains now stretch 
across the borders of NAFTA member states.129 For example, U.S. producers 
imported nearly 5 million pigs from Canada in 2014.130 These pigs were 
finished and slaughtered in the U.S., and a significant portion of the pork 
products were re-exported to Canada or Mexico.131
C. Regional Variation
Because industries and factors of production (i.e. capital, skilled vs. 
unskilled labor, natural resources, etc.) are not evenly distributed across the 
U.S., lowering barriers to trade will have different economic impacts in different 
parts of the country. A study published by Robert Scott in 2001132 uses the same 
basic methodology as in Scott’s 2011 study133 to estimate the effect of NAFTA 
on employment in all fifty U.S. states. Again, the analysis makes two critical 
(and dubious) assumptions: 1) changes in the trade deficit after 1994 can be 
attributed to NAFTA, and 2) the excess of imported products over exports would 
otherwise have been produced in the U.S. without NAFTA.134 Scott finds that
California, Michigan, and New York experienced the largest total job losses due 
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to NAFTA.135 Alaska, Wyoming, and North Dakota experienced the smallest 
job losses.136
Again, it is difficult to link the trade balance to changes in trade policy or 
changes in the trade balance to changes in the level of employment. A 2016 
study by Hakobyan and McLaren takes a different approach, studying how 
increased exposure to Mexican imports due to NAFTA has affected wages at 
the regional level.137 They begin by calculating regional measures of exposures 
to Mexican import competition, measured at the level of a Consistent Public-
Use Microdata Area or “conspuma.”138 Their measure of exposure aggregates 
conspuma-level information on the sizes of each industry, the level of the tariff 
on Mexican goods for that industry, and a measure of Mexico’s comparative 
advantage in that industry.139 The degree of concentration they find is 
remarkable; eight of the top ten most vulnerable conspumas were in North and 
South Carolina.140 Unsurprisingly, they find that areas most exposed to Mexican 
imports experienced slower wage growth.141 They also find that these effects 
are larger for workers with the lowest levels of education.142
Hakobyan and McLaren’s study is limited by the fact that it focuses 
specifically on the negative effects due to increased import competition from 
Mexico. This paints a somewhat gloomy picture of NAFTA, with no apparent 
upside. It is important to remember that many firms (and their employees) 
benefit from imported intermediates sourced from both Canada and Mexico.143
States also differ in the extent to which NAFTA has reshaped these supply 
chains.144 Brookings recently published a study examining how reliant each 
state is on intermediate goods imported from Canada and Mexico.145 Overall, 
nearly 50% of U.S. trade with NAFTA partners is in intermediates.146 However, 
this figure varies tremendously from state to state. Montana sourced 92.6% of 
their imported intermediates from NAFTA countries in 2015.147 Louisiana, on 
the other hand, relied on NAFTA partners for only 8.2% of their imported 
intermediates.148 The rapid expansion of intermediates trade has been 
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accompanied by massive flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among 
NAFTA partners. Around 50% of total FDI in both Canada149 and Mexico150
comes from the United States. 
NAFTA has also benefited some U.S. states through increased export 
opportunities. This has been especially important for U.S. agriculture and the 
states where these farms are located.151 Farmers in the Midwest enjoy large 
export markets in Mexico and Canada for their corn and soybeans.152 These 
farms are generally concentrated in the Midwest, spread out across Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas.153 NAFTA has also created 
export opportunities for pork exporters, which are even more concentrated, 
largely in Iowa.154 Regions with large clusters of dairy producers are likely to 
benefit from the increased access to Canadian markets negotiated under the 
USMCA. 
No study has attempted to fully decompose the effects of NAFTA across 
states accounting for increased import competition, export opportunities, and 
offshoring. However, the 2014 study referenced above suggests that the benefits 
have gone to states that are populated with skilled workers and host firms that 
have expanded their supply chains into Mexico and Canada.155 NAFTA has also 
probably benefited a number of Midwestern states as they found new markets 
for their agricultural exports. However, the fact that NAFTA has produced only 
minute aggregate gains for the U.S. implies that these gains are mostly balanced 
out by the costs imposed on other states, workers, and firms.156
The uneven regional distribution of winners and losers from NAFTA means 
that this policy is inherently a transfer of wealth among the states. Similarly, the 
USMCA will imply further transfers of wealth among U.S. states. Some states 
will benefit from increased export opportunities (e.g. dairy), while states that 
rely more heavily on the auto industry may suffer, if critics’ fears about the new 
rules of origin and “minimum wage” provisions are realized.157 Negotiations 
took place under the President’s “trade promotion authority,” which means 
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legislators in the House and Senate will only have the opportunity to vote the 
revised treaty up or down.158 Such a limited role for Congress in the negotiation 
process means that states may have to rely on their own powers to adapt to 
whatever changes the USMCA might bring.
IV. TRADE POLICY AND STATE GOVERNMENT
The U.S. Constitution vests the power to conduct foreign affairs in the 
federal government.159 The Supremacy Clause and Commerce Clause together 
make it clear that federal law will generally preempt state law in matters of 
international trade.160 The Supreme Court has further clarified that state policies 
affecting international commerce will receive special scrutiny, even if they 
pertain to powers normally exercised by the states.161 This gives states very few 
options for responding to the costs and benefits imposed on them by federal 
trade negotiations. Explicit protections like state-level tariffs and quotas are out 
of the question.
However, the courts have carved out some legal space for state and local 
governments to operate in this arena. First, states may be able to engage with 
international commerce when they have the express consent of Congress.162 In 
this case, the state laws would not be subject to federal preemption because they 
are acting as “mere creatures of the state,” assisting the federal government in 
its charge to manage foreign affairs.163 Without the express consent of 
Congress, state or local laws that relate to international commerce must pass two 
tests: 1) the laws have a legitimate local purpose, and 2) the laws do not interfere 
with the federal government’s ability to “speak with one voice” on international 
issues.164 This sets a high bar. The actions of Congress or the President will 
preempt any state laws inconsistent those federal actions.165 State laws may also 
be unconstitutional if the federal government merely demonstrates an intent to 
“occupy the field” covered by those state laws.166 Presuming that managing the 
local impacts of international trade deals constitutes a legitimate local interest, 
states still must not interfere with the federal government’s ability to conduct 
foreign policy. 
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A. Government Procurement
Despite these limitations, state and local governments still have relatively 
broad latitude when it comes to procurement decisions. In South-Central Timber 
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court found that states can impose 
restrictions on procurement that would otherwise not be allowed if the states 
were acting as regulators.167 This could allow the states to partially shield local 
firms from foreign competition. For example, state and municipal governments 
could give preferential treatment to bids from local firms in procurement 
decisions. The so-called “Massachusetts Burma Law” famously tested the limits 
of this power.168 The Massachusetts state government attempted to penalize 
firms doing business with Myanmar (Burma) over human rights concerns.169
The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the law, finding it went beyond 
Massachusetts acting as a “market participant.”170 Rather, the law required that 
the state monitor the activities of firms doing business with Myanmar.171 The 
Court also pointed out that the law was crafted with the express intention of 
affecting the behavior of a foreign country, while the federal government had 
already imposed its own sanctions.172
Chapter 10 of NAFTA contains specific language covering government 
procurement.173 The agreement targets non-defense related procurement 
covering nearly all federal agencies.174 The general principle is that 
governments of NAFTA signatories must not discriminate against goods and 
services from other NAFTA countries.175 NAFTA members also agree not to 
impose “offsets,” which are conditions in procurement contracts that would 
require a foreign firm to take actions that would benefit local firms.176 This 
might include local content requirements or licensing of technology.177
However, state and local governments were not covered by the commitments in 
Chapter 10.178 The USMCA reproduces the same commitments on government 
procurement for the U.S., but with updated monetary thresholds.179 It would 
seem there are still no legal obstacles to state and local firms using procurement 
decisions to protect local firms, so long as they remain simply a market
participant.
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Government procurement as a tool of economic development has been 
studied extensively in developing countries. The World Bank has argued that it 
is vitally important for low income countries.180 Government procurement has 
also contributed to the development of important technologies in the developed 
world.181 However, there is very little research on the effectiveness of state and 
local government procurement as a development strategy in high income 
countries. Some have also expressed concern that preferentially sourcing from 
local firms may lead to a reduction in the quality of goods and services 
governments are able to provide.182 More research is necessary before one can 
conclude that procurement is an effective strategy for managing the local effects 
of changes in trade policy.
B. Export Promotion
Export promotion is a common strategy adopted by states seeking to 
participate in international commerce. In this case, states have received the 
express consent of Congress to engage with international commerce. The Export 
Trading Company Act of 1982 states “[t]hose activities of State and local 
governmental authorities which initiate, facilitate, or expand exports of goods 
and services can be an important source for expansion of total United States 
exports . . . . ”183 Congress also called for more coordination between local and 
federal agencies in export promotion with the Export Enhancement Act of 
1992.184
All fifty states engage in some form of export promotion, with 
responsibilities spread across various government agencies.185 Export 
promotion can take many forms, including outreach and training to give firms 
the information they need to start exporting.186 This might include training on 
the logistics and regulatory hurdles to marketing their products in a foreign 
country. State governments can also play the role of “matchmaker” by 
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organizing trade missions abroad.187 State governors play an especially 
important role here as “economic ambassadors.”188 They can help local firms 
identify foreign markets for their goods, as well as connect them directly with 
partners in the foreign country. Finally, states can provide export financing as 
part of their export promotion strategy.189 State agencies can provide loans to 
help businesses cover the costs of marketing and logistics associated with selling 
products internationally.190 Export financing agencies can also provide accounts 
receivable financing, i.e. borrowing against accounts receivable to free up 
working capital while waiting for international transactions to clear.191 All of 
these services are especially important to small businesses. 
The effectiveness of these export promotion strategies is not well-
established in the literature. Early studies of export promotion were generally 
qualitative and focused more on managers’ perceptions of the effectiveness of 
the program.192 It is particularly difficult to evaluate these programs because 
firms already engaged in international markets are more likely to self-select into 
the programs.193 Therefore, it should be no surprise to find a positive 
relationship between participation in export promotion and engagement in 
international trade. It is more difficult to establish that export promotion 
programs cause firms to engage in international trade. A recent comprehensive 
review of the literature on export promotion yields limited support for the 
hypothesis that these programs boost state exports.194 The success of the 
program seems contingent on the type of firm participating and the time span 
over which the program is studied.195
C. Tax and Regulatory Incentives
States may also engage in international commerce by offering tax and 
regulatory incentives to invite new businesses to invest in the area or to retain 
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businesses threatening to leave.196 States will often compete for investment by 
offering lower individual and corporate income taxes, as well as lower sales and 
property taxes.197 States might also offer tax credits for increasing local 
employment, investment, and research and development (R&D).198 States could 
use these kinds of policies to promote local economic activity in the wake of the 
NAFTA renegotiation. However, the legal and economic justifications for such 
tax incentives are not particularly strong. 
U.S. states have a long history of competing to attract businesses with tax 
reductions or favorable regulatory treatment.199 Surprisingly, the economics 
literature has only recently been able to demonstrate that these incentives have 
a positive effect on businesses’ location decisions.200 It is less clear that these 
incentives have a net positive effect on the regions that offer them. While it has 
been demonstrated that tax incentives can attract R&D201 and capital202 to the 
locality offering them, these positive effects might be offset by a reduction in 
public services due to the decreased tax base.203 Studies of local tax incentives 
have also shown that they may be a “zero-sum game” – the benefits to the state 
offering the incentive are matched by losses to surrounding states.204
Trade agreements also constrain states’ abilities to use these kinds of 
incentives. This is illustrated by a recent case involving tax incentives provided 
by Washington state to aircraft manufacturer Boeing.205 In 2013, the 
Washington State Legislature offered Boeing $8.7 billion in tax relief to keep 
production of the 777X in the state.206 The European Union brought a case to 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body alleging that these tax incentives constituted 
an illegal subsidy.207 After an initial ruling in the EU’s favor, the WTO 
Appellate Body rejected the EU’s claim that Washington state had provided 
“prohibited” subsidies to Boeing.208 However, the ruling leaves open the 
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possibility that the tax incentives could be found to be “actionable subsidies,”
which was the basis of an earlier, successful dispute lodged by the EU against a 
similar tax incentive deal for Boeing.209 If a state attempted to use similar 
incentives to adjust to a newly-renegotiated NAFTA, it could easily end up 
facing a similar challenge. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Trump Administration’s aggressive negotiating strategy is a departure 
from the norms established in previous Administrations.210 In the past, trade 
agreements have been conducted as strategic exchanges of market access for 
mutual benefit. The current Administration’s “America first” rhetoric seems to 
signal a change in negotiating strategy. This was also reflected in the USTR’s
objectives for renegotiating NAFTA. In this case, the USTR was not able to 
achieve negotiating objectives that would have allowed the President to raise 
substantial trade barriers with our NAFTA partners. Instead, the USMCA 
appears to be a narrow update of the existing NAFTA agreement. Like NAFTA, 
it is unlikely to have a large effect on overall U.S. GDP growth or 
unemployment, but the costs and benefits will be distributed unevenly across 
the states. 
This Article has explored the legal constraints states will face as they 
attempt to respond to the changes USMCA will bring. In short, states’ options 
are very limited. They face severe Constitutional constraints as well as 
constraints imposed by existing trade agreements. While they enjoy express 
Congressional approval for export promotion, there are limits on what they can 
do to protect local industry through procurement and tax policy. There is also 
very limited evidence that these measures can increase local economic growth. 
States may need to rely on political forces, rather than policy, to weather the 
storm of USMCA and future trade negotiations. Many rural areas that voted for 
Trump in the 2016 election depend on export markets available to them through 
NAFTA. He will certainly need the support of those districts if he expects to run 
for reelection in 2020. This might have disciplined the Administration’s
approach to USMCA and, at the very least, prevented the Administration from 
walking away from the negotiations. The trade promotion authority insulates the 
renegotiation from conventional channels of political influence, but the states 
can also look for other solutions through their representatives in Congress. For 
example, states might lobby for an expansion of Trade Adjustment 
Assistance.211
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Uncertainty around trade deals like USMCA will probably be a major theme 
of this presidency. President Trump has taken similarly aggressive stances with 
other allies, with recent steel and aluminum tariffs providing notable
examples.212 It is difficult to predict which states will win and which states will 
lose in these negotiations. However, it is clear that states need to start thinking 
creatively about how they can protect themselves against abrupt changes in trade 
policy in the future.
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